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OPINION 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 This case returns to us after the Supreme Court’s 
review in Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975 
(2012). Remand requires that we reach the merits of 
Reynolds’s claim that the regulatory rule upon which his 
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indictment was based was promulgated in violation of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). This claim gives 
rise to three questions: (1) What is the appropriate 
standard of review of an agency’s assertion of good cause 
in waiving the APA’s notice and comment requirements? 
(2) Did the Attorney General have good cause to waive 
these requirements in promulgating a rule governing the 
retroactivity of the Sex Offender and Registration 
Notification Act’s (“SORNA”) registration 
requirements? (3) If the Attorney General lacked good 
cause to waive the requirements, was Reynolds 
prejudiced by the failure to comply with the APA’s 
notice and comment requirements?  
 The courts of appeals are divided on each of these 
questions. On the first question, the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits have determined that the arbitrary and capricious 
standard is the appropriate standard for reviewing the 
Attorney General’s actions, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits 
have not stated a standard but appear to use de novo 
review, and the Ninth Circuit has explicitly avoided the 
question.1
                                                 
1 Compare United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 928 
(5th Cir. 2011) (arbitrary and capricious); United States 
v. Dean, 604 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2010) (same), 
with United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 469–70 (4th 
Cir. 2009) (unstated, appears de novo); United States v. 
Cain, 583 F.3d 408, 419–23 (6th Cir. 2009) (same), with 
 On the second question, the Fourth and 
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Eleventh Circuits have held that the Attorney General 
had good cause to waive notice and comment, while the 
Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held that he did 
not.2 On the final question, the Fifth Circuit has held that 
the Attorney General’s lack of good cause does not 
prejudice defendants, while the Sixth Circuit has held 
that it is prejudicial.3
 We conclude that we need not decide the 
appropriate standard of review today because the 
  
                                                                                                             
United States v. Valverde, 628 F.3d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 
2010) (explicitly avoids question). 
 
2 Compare Gould, 568 F.3d at 470; Dean, 604 F.3d at 
1281–82, with Johnson, 632 F.3d at 928; Valverde, 628 
F.3d at 1165–66; Cain, 583 F.3d at 422–24. 
3 Compare Johnson, 632 F.3d at 930–32; Dean, 604 F.3d 
at 1288–89 (Wilson, J. concurring), with United States v. 
Utesch, 596 F.3d 302, 312–13 (6th Cir. 2010). 
The Seventh Circuit has joined the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Eleventh Circuits in upholding the Interim Rule, but the 
basis for its conclusion is unclear. United States v. Dixon, 
551 F.3d 578, 583 (7th Cir. 2008) (dismissing a 
defendant’s “frivolous” APA challenge to the Interim 
Rule in a parenthetical). 
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Attorney General’s assertion of good cause cannot 
withstand review even under the most deferential 
standard available. We also conclude that the Attorney 
General’s lack of good cause is prejudicial to Reynolds. 
Accordingly, we will vacate Reynolds’ conviction. 
I 
 In 2001, Reynolds was convicted of sexually 
assaulting a seven-year-old girl in Missouri. This 
conviction required him to register as a sex offender, 
which he did for the next six years. Meanwhile, Congress 
passed SORNA in 2006, which required individuals 
convicted of sex offenses after its enactment to comply 
with certain registration requirements. Through the 
promulgation of an administrative rule on February 28, 
2007, the Attorney General made SORNA’s registration 
requirements retroactive to those convicted of sex 
offenses before its enactment—i.e., sexual offenders such 
as Reynolds. 
On September 16, 2007, Reynolds moved to 
Washington, Pennsylvania. He failed both to update his 
place of residence and employment information in 
Missouri and to register as a sex offender in 
Pennsylvania. Police discovered these registration 
violations on October 16, 2007, when Reynolds was 
arrested for violating parole. He was subsequently 
indicted for violating SORNA’s registration requirements 
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because of his failure to register between September 16, 
2007 and October 16, 2007. He pleaded guilty, reserving 
his right to appeal. He was sentenced to eighteen months 
of imprisonment to be followed by three years of 
supervised release. 
A. Procedural History 
 Reynolds’s primary challenge to his conviction has 
been to its legal basis. In the District Court, he moved to 
dismiss the indictment, arguing that SORNA violated the 
nondelegation doctrine, the Commerce Clause, the Ex 
Post Facto Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and his Fifth 
Amendment substantive and procedural due process 
rights. Finally, he argued that even if SORNA did not 
violate the Constitution, his indictment should be 
dismissed because it was based on an administrative rule 
promulgated by the Attorney General that did not comply 
with the requirements of the APA. The District Court 
rejected each of these arguments and denied his motion 
to dismiss the indictment. Reynolds subsequently entered 
into a plea agreement that specifically reserved his right 
to appeal those issues argued in his motion to dismiss the 
indictment. 
In his first appeal to this Court following his guilty 
plea, Reynolds presented these same arguments. Bound 
by United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 
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2010),4
                                                 
4 Shenandoah was decided by a different panel of this 
Court shortly before this panel’s first decision in this 
case. The defendant in Shenandoah asserted the same 
arguments (plus an additional one based on the right to 
travel) brought by Reynolds in his first appeal to this 
panel: “that SORNA violated the Non-Delegation 
Doctrine, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Ex Post 
Facto Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Commerce 
Clause, the Tenth Amendment and his right to travel.” 
595 F.3d at 154. The Shenandoah panel rejected the Ex 
Post Facto Clause, Due Process Clause, Commerce 
Clause, and right to travel claims on their merits, id. 
at 158–61, 162–63, and held that the defendant lacked 
standing to make the nondelegation doctrine, APA, and 
Tenth Amendment claims, id. at 161–62, 163–64.  
 we upheld the District Court because the 
Central to Shenandoah’s holding that the defendant 
lacked standing for his nondelegation and APA claims 
was its interpretation of SORNA—namely that 
SORNA’s registration requirements applied to pre-
SORNA sex offenders automatically, without any action 
needed by the Attorney General. This understanding of 
SORNA made the administrative rule challenged by the 
defendant irrelevant to his case, in that SORNA, rather 
than the rule, was the basis of his conviction. Id. at 157–
58, 163–64. This understanding of SORNA was rejected 
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Commerce Clause, Ex Post Facto, and Fifth Amendment 
arguments lacked merit and because Reynolds lacked 
standing to assert his APA, nondelegation, and Tenth 
Amendment arguments. United States v. Reynolds, 380 
Fed. App’x 125, 126 (3d Cir. 2010); see also 
Shenandoah, 595 F.3d at 158–64. Reynolds filed a 
petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court that 
requested review of these holdings. Pet. Writ Cert. at i, 
Reynolds v. United States (No. 10-6549), 2010 WL 
5624498. The Supreme Court granted the petition limited 
to the question of whether Reynolds had standing to 
assert his APA and nondelegation arguments. Reynolds v. 
United States, 131 S. Ct. 1043 (2011). The Court 
reversed, holding that he did have standing to make those 
arguments. Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975, 978 
                                                                                                             
by the Supreme Court in its Reynolds decision. Reynolds 
v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975, 978 (2012).  
The defendant lacked standing to raise his Tenth 
Amendment claim because, at the time of the decision, 
private parties were thought to be unable to assert Tenth 
Amendment claims absent the involvement of a State. Id. 
at 161–62. This holding was rejected by the Supreme 
Court in Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011). 
In that case, the Supreme Court held that private persons 
may assert Tenth Amendment arguments even when an 
apparatus of the State is not a party to the suit.  Id. at 
2360, 2367. 
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(2012). 
In reversing, the Supreme Court rejected this 
Court’s interpretation in Shenandoah of the power 
delegated to the Attorney General by SORNA’s 
registration requirement. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d) (“The 
Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the 
applicability of the [registration] requirements . . . to sex 
offenders convicted before the enactment of this chapter 
. . . , and to prescribe rules for the registration of any such 
sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders 
who are unable to comply with subsection (b).”); 42 
U.S.C. § 16913(b) (providing when sex offenders other 
than those who had already completed their sentences 
should initially register).5
                                                 
5 42 U.S.C. § 16913(b) provides that 
 In Shenandoah, this Court 
concluded that this provision automatically made 
SORNA’s registration requirements applicable without 
any action by the Attorney General to sex offenders who 
[t]he sex offender shall initially register (1) 
before completing a sentence of 
imprisonment with respect to the offense 
giving rise to the registration requirement; or 
(2) not later than 3 business days after being 
sentenced for that offense, if the sex 
offender is not sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment.  
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had been convicted before SORNA was enacted and who 
had already completed their prison sentences. 595 F.3d at 
158. This meant that Reynolds’s obligation to register 
under SORNA was derived from the Act itself and not 
from the administrative rule promulgated by the Attorney 
General. Accordingly, Shenandoah required us to 
conclude that he could not challenge the legality of the 
administrative rule because the statute, not the rule, was 
the basis of his conviction. Reynolds, 380 Fed. App’x at 
126; Shenandoah, 595 F.3d at 163–64. 
The Supreme Court interpreted § 16913 otherwise. 
The Court held that the registration requirement did not 
automatically apply retroactively to sex offenders who 
committed their offense before SORNA was enacted. 
Instead, the Court explained that under § 16913, “the 
Act’s registration requirements do not apply to pre-Act 
offenders until the Attorney General specifies that they 
do apply.” Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. at 978. This means, 
contrary to this Court’s previous holding, that Reynolds’s 
obligation to register under SORNA does not derive from 
the Act itself but from the administrative rule 
promulgated by the Attorney General. We must now 
reach the merits of the claim Reynolds raises challenging 
the legality of that rule. Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. at 984 
(“Whether the Attorney General’s Interim Rule sets forth 
a valid specification consequently matters in the case 
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before us.”).6
B. Administrative History 
 
 At issue here is the Attorney General’s February 
28, 2007 Interim Rule that made SORNA’s registration 
requirements retroactive for all pre-SORNA offenders. 
Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 8894-01, 8897 (Feb. 28, 
2007) [hereinafter “Interim Rule”]. The Attorney General 
issued this Interim Rule seven months after SORNA 
delegated authority to him to make SORNA retroactive. 
The Attorney General did not provide the period for 
notice and comment required under 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), 
nor did he provide the minimum thirty-day delay before 
the rule became effective under 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(3). 
Instead, he concluded that notice and comment were not 
required because “good cause” existed pursuant to 5 
U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) and that requiring those procedures 
                                                 
6 As we noted in footnote 4, our previous holding that 
Reynolds lacked standing to assert his Tenth Amendment 
challenge has also been overruled by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bond, 131 S. Ct. 2355. We 
acknowledge that Reynolds now has standing to raise a 
Tenth Amendment argument but decline to reach the 
issue because we conclude that the Attorney General 
failed to promulgate the rule in accordance with the 
APA. 
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would be “contrary to the public interest.” Interim Rule, 
72 Fed. Reg. at 8896–97 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B)). 
He provided the following reasons to support his finding 
of good cause: 
The immediate effectiveness of this rule is 
necessary to eliminate any possible 
uncertainty about the applicability of the 
Act’s requirements—and related means of 
enforcement, including criminal liability 
under 18 U.S.C. 2250 for sex offenders who 
knowingly fail to register as required—to 
sex offenders whose predicate convictions 
predate the enactment of SORNA. Delay in 
the implementation of this rule would 
impede the effective registration of such sex 
offenders and would impair immediate 
efforts to protect the public from sex 
offenders who fail to register through 
prosecution and the imposition of criminal 
sanctions. The resulting practical dangers 
include the commission of additional sexual 
assaults and child sexual abuse or 
exploitation offenses by sex offenders that 
could have been prevented had local 
authorities and the community been aware 
of their presence, in addition to greater 
difficulty in apprehending perpetrators who 
have not been registered and tracked as 
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provided by SORNA. This would thwart the 
legislative objective of “protect[ing] the 
public from sex offenders and offenders 
against children” by establishing “a 
comprehensive national system for the 
registration of those offenders,” SORNA § 
102, because a substantial class of sex 
offenders could evade the Act’s registration 
requirements and enforcement mechanisms 
during the pendency of a proposed rule and 
delay in the effectiveness of a final rule. 
Id. Finally, the Interim Rule allowed comments to be 
submitted for two months after promulgation. Id. at 8894. 
 Three months after the Interim Rule took effect, 
the Attorney General issued Proposed Guidelines for the 
interpretation and implementation of SORNA. The 
National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification, 72 Fed. Reg. 30210-01, 30210 (proposed 
May 30, 2007) [hereinafter “Proposed Guidelines”]. 
These Proposed Guidelines included the proposed final 
rule governing SORNA’s retroactivity to pre-Act 
offenders. It also solicited comments on all of the 
guidelines’ proposals, which were due August 1, 2007. 
Id. at 30210, 30212–13, 30228–29. Thirteen months after 
issuing the Proposed Guidelines, the Attorney General 
promulgated the Final Rule. It was a reiteration of the 
same rule set out in the Interim Rule regarding 
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retroactivity. The National Guidelines for Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38030-01, 
38030, 38046–47 (July 2, 2008) [hereinafter “Final 
Rule”].7
II 
 
 Reynolds’s conviction is based on the Interim Rule 
because the conduct alleged in the indictment occurred 
from September 16, 2007 to October 16, 2007, 
approximately ten months before the Final Rule went 
into effect. Reynolds challenges the validity of the 
Interim Rule on two grounds. First, he argues that the 
                                                 
7 We describe this regulation as the Final Rule because 
the parties have presented it as such. But our description 
is not intended to express our view on whether this 2008 
action or a later action in 2010 actually finalized the 
Interim Rule. See Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 38030; 
Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 81849-01, 81850 (Dec. 
29, 2010) [hereinafter “2010 Final Rule”]. Accordingly, 
our description of the 2008 guidelines as the Final Rule 
should not be interpreted to endorse the view that the 
2008 action created binding rules. The Attorney General 
appears to do just that in relation to the Sixth Circuit’s 
use of the same language in United States v. Utesch, 596 
F.3d 302 (6th Cir. 2010). 2010 Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 
at 81850 (citing Utesch, 596 F.3d at 310–11). 
 15 
 
Attorney General did not have “good cause” under the 
APA to waive its procedural requirements. Second, he 
argues that Congress’ delegation to the Attorney General 
of the authority to make SORNA retroactive is an 
unconstitutional delegation. Because we conclude that 
the Attorney General did not provide sufficient 
justification for his finding of good cause and that this 
error prejudiced Reynolds, we do not reach Reynolds’s 
nondelegation argument. 
 Our jurisdiction to hear this case is provided by 28 
U.S.C. § 1291, while the District Court’s jurisdiction was 
provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Our standard of review 
for a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an 
indictment is mixed. We review de novo a district court’s 
legal conclusions and a district court’s factual 
determinations for clear error. United States v. Nolan-
Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 229 (3d Cir. 1998). Reynolds 
challenges the District Court’s legal conclusions only, so 
we apply the de novo standard.  
A. Standard of Review 
 We must consider the parties’ dispute over our 
standard of review for an administrative agency’s 
assertion of good cause under § 553(b)(B) of the APA 
before deciding if good cause existed. The parties and 
our prior decisions provide three possible standards: de 
novo, mixed, and arbitrary and capricious. Reynolds 
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argues that the appropriate standard is de novo under 
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D), while the Attorney General argues 
for arbitrary and capricious review under 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2)(A).8
                                                 
8 The text of 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A) & (2)(D) is: 
 Supporting the government’s position are 
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’ use of the arbitrary and 
capricious standard in their SORNA decisions. United 
States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 928 (5th Cir. 2011); 
United States v. Dean, 604 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 
2010). The arbitrary and capricious standard follows 
from § 706(2)(A)’s explicit inclusion of that standard as 
well as the provision’s broader scope of review that 
To the extent necessary to decision and 
when presented, the reviewing court shall 
decide all relevant questions of law, 
interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency 
action. The reviewing court shall . . . (2) 
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings, and conclusions found to be:  
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law; 
. . . 
(D) without observance of procedure 
required by law. 
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allows for review of agencies’ factual determinations. 
Marsh, 490 U.S. at 376; Gardner v. Grandolsky, 585 
F.3d 786, 792 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Supporting Reynolds’s position are the Fourth and 
Sixth Circuits’ application of de novo review, although 
these courts do not specifically state the standard they 
applied. United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 469–70 
(4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Cain, 583 F.3d 408, 
420–21 (6th Cir. 2009). De novo review follows from the 
limited scope of review provided to courts in § 706(2)(D) 
to ensure that agency actions, findings, and conclusions 
are completed in “observance of procedure required by 
law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D), which is a legal question for 
which de novo review would typically be utilized. See 
Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376–
77 (1989); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 
(1988). Each party’s position, therefore, has support from 
other courts of appeals. 
Notably, none of these decisions has extensively 
analyzed the standard of review question and only the 
Fifth and Ninth Circuits have directly linked their 
discussion of the standard to § 706. Johnson, 632 F.3d at 
928 & n.86; United States v. Valverde, 628 F.3d 1159, 
1162 (9th Cir. 2010). For its part, the Ninth Circuit chose 
not to decide what standard should be applied. Valverde, 
628 F.3d at 1162. What the appropriate standard is, 
therefore, has not received in-depth analysis despite the 
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disagreement on the ultimate conclusion. For that reason, 
we will take up where those courts left off. 
 The ambiguity created by the foregoing 
disagreement is heightened by the absence of an 
expressed standard in many non-SORNA good cause 
decisions by courts of appeals. Instead, courts have 
resolved these cases by interpreting § 553’s good cause 
provision with a limiting principle. This principle is most 
commonly formulated as a direction that “good cause” 
should be “narrowly construed.” Cain, 583 F.3d at 420; 
Gould, 568 F.3d at 469; Dean, 604 F.3d at 1278; 
Johnson, 632 F.3d at 928 (explaining that good cause 
should be “read narrowly”); Valverde, 628 F.3d at 1164 
(stating that notice and comment can be waived only in 
“narrow circumstances”). Some courts—including this 
one—have elaborated on this interpretive framework by 
explaining that “circumstances justifying reliance on the 
good cause exception are ‘indeed rare’ and will be 
accepted only after the court has examined closely 
proffered rationales justifying the elimination of public 
procedures.” Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 
F.2d 752, 764 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting Council of the S. 
Mountains, Inc. v. Donovan, 653 F.2d 573 (D.C. Cir. 
1981)) (alterations and quotation marks omitted); see 
also Mid-Tex Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n, 822 F.2d 1123, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“This 
court has cautioned that the § 553(b)(3)(B) exception 
should be narrowly construed and reluctantly 
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countenanced. That admonition means our inquiry should 
be a close one.” (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)). This interpretive framework has been 
developed separate and apart from § 706, derived from 
the legislative history of the good cause exception. Am. 
Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 291–92 (3d Cir. 
1977). 
 Our application of this interpretive principle 
generally suggests that de novo review is the correct 
standard for examining claims of good cause under the 
APA. But the close examination required by de novo 
review, Natural Res. Def. Council, 683 F.2d at 764, is 
inconsistent with the deference afforded under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard. See id. at 760 (“The 
exacting standard applicable in determining whether an 
agency has failed to comply with the [APA’s] procedural 
requirements [of notice and comment] for its action 
contrasts with the deferential standard applicable to 
substantive challenges to agency action.”). 
One of our decisions, however, is more ambivalent 
about whether narrow construction of good cause 
mandates de novo review exclusively. Philadelphia 
Citizens in Action v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 
1982), suggests that the narrow-construction limiting-
principle can be applied consistently with arbitrary and 
capricious as well as de novo review through the use of a 
mixed standard. There, we reviewed de novo whether 
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“shortness of time can [ever] constitute good cause for 
invoking the [good cause] exemption” and whether the 
particular circumstances the department found itself in 
were indeed good cause. 669 F.2d at 883. We then 
employed arbitrary and capricious review for whether the 
agency was correct to conclude that “alternative 
procedure[s]” the agency could have utilized “were 
impracticable under the circumstances.” Id. at 886.  
Schweiker’s bifurcated analysis shows that the 
narrow-construction limiting-principle supports the third 
standard available—a mixed standard—consistent with 
both de novo and arbitrary and capricious review. This 
mixed standard requires that we review de novo whether 
the agency’s asserted reason for waiver of notice and 
comment constitutes good cause, as well as whether the 
established facts reveal justifiable reliance on the reason. 
But any factual determinations made by the agency to 
support its proffered reason are subject to arbitrary and 
capricious review. 
So while some of our good cause decisions—such 
as Natural Resources Defense Council and Mobay—
suggest that de novo review is the appropriate standard in 
light of the narrow-construction limiting-principle, 
Schweiker suggests that this principle could also support 
mixed review. Clearly, our decisions are in tension with 
one another because similar procedural determinations 
afforded deference in Schweiker are afforded little or no 
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deference in Natural Resources Defense Council and 
Mobay. Fortunately, we need not abate that tension here 
because we conclude that the Attorney General’s good 
cause determination will not pass muster under any of the 
available standards. 
In summary, § 706 and our prior decisions provide 
us with three possible standards: de novo, mixed, and 
arbitrary and capricious. Selecting the appropriate 
standard gives rise to several difficult questions. The first 
is how to resolve the tension between Schweiker and our 
other good cause decisions. There is reason to doubt 
Schweiker’s use of mixed review because the decision 
appears to be an outlier from the body of good-cause 
case-law from this Court, as well as other courts of 
appeals.9
                                                 
9 This concern is only increased by the legal support 
Schweiker relies on for its inclusion of arbitrary and 
capricious review. The Schweiker Court cites to an 
American Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA decision that is 
different from the American Iron & Steel discussed in our 
good cause analysis here. The case Schweiker relies on 
for arbitrary and capricious review only addresses issues 
other than procedural defect. Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. 
EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1035, 1042, 1045, 1047 (3d Cir. 
1975) (analyzing arguments related to the EPA’s power 
to promulgate the rule, the nature of that power, and the 
substance of the rule itself). Section 553’s good cause 
 Mixed review, however, is consistent with the 
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text of § 706 because it includes no requirement that only 
one provision of the section be applied to a particular 
review—the section allows us to apply one standard to 
legal determinations and another to factual 
determinations made in an administrative decision. This 
conformance with § 706 is important because of the 
Supreme Court’s direction that “[t]he standards to be 
applied on review are governed by the provisions of 
§ 706.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985); 
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1999) 
(“[r]ecognizing the importance of maintaining a uniform 
approach to judicial review of administrative action” 
found in § 706 to hold that deviations from the standards 
“must be clear[ly]” established by statute or common 
law). This direction by the Court requires that any 
selection among the three standards be guided by a 
determination of what the respective scopes of 
§ 706(2)(A) and (2)(D) are in relation to one another—a 
topic for which there is surprisingly little guidance.  
We decline, for now, to resolve these questions. 
We conclude that the Attorney General’s assertion of 
good cause fails even the most deferential standard of 
arbitrary and capricious. Accord Valverde, 628 F.3d 
                                                                                                             
provision was not at issue in that decision. Schweiker’s 
reliance on it as informing a determination as to the 
standard that should be applied in good case cases is 
therefore questionable.  
 23 
 
at 1162. Just what is the applicable standard of review for 
agency determinations that good cause justifies waiver of 
notice and comment is a question for another day. 
B. Good Cause 
 As with the standard of review, appellate courts 
are divided over whether the Attorney General’s 
justifications are sufficient to support a good cause 
determination. The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have 
concluded they are sufficient. Gould, 568 F.3d at 470; 
Dean, 604 F.3d at 1281–82. The Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth 
Circuits have held otherwise. Johnson, 632 F.3d at 928; 
Cain, 583 F.3d at 422–24; Valverde, 628 F.3d at 1165–
66. We agree with the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits 
that the two reasons provided in the Interim Rule are not 
sufficient to establish good cause because the Attorney 
General’s reasons for good cause would eviscerate the 
APA’s notice and comment requirements.10
                                                 
10 Having the benefit of further development on the good 
cause question, the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion is more 
developed than the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning, which was 
the first offered on the good cause question. Compare 
Dean, 604 F.3d at 1281–82, with Gould, 568 F.3d at 470. 
We will thus focus on the Eleventh Circuit’s rationale as 
setting forth the competing understanding with which we 
ultimately disagree. 
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Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, a 
court’s scope of review is “narrow, and a court is not to 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Gardner, 
585 F.3d at 790 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
“[A] reviewing court may not supply a reasoned basis for 
the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given,” 
but it can “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if 
the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned” from the 
record. Id. (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43). “[W]e 
reverse an agency’s decision when it ‘is not supported by 
substantial evidence, or the agency has made a clear error 
in judgment.’” Prometheus Radio Project v. F.C.C., 373 
F.3d 372, 390 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting AT&T Corp. v. 
F.C.C., 220 F.3d 607, 616 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). The Interim 
Rule cannot withstand review under this standard. The 
Attorney General’s rationale is not supported by 
substantial evidence and constitutes a clear error of 
judgment because the logical extension of the bases 
offered to support it lacks a limiting principle. 
 Notice and comment may be waived “when the 
agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding 
and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules 
issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are 
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public 
interest.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B). The Attorney General 
concluded that good cause existed because undergoing 
notice and comment for the Interim Rule would be 
 25 
 
“contrary to the public interest,” offering two reasons. 
Interim Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 8896–97. First, he asserted 
that there was a need to immediately “eliminate any 
possible uncertainty” whether SORNA applied 
retroactively. Id. Second, he contended that waiver was 
necessary in order to “protect the public from sex 
offenders who fail to register” and thereby create 
“practical dangers,” including “the commission of 
additional sexual assaults and child sexual abuse or 
exploitation offenses by sex offenders.” Id. We discuss 
each reason in turn. 
  The desire to eliminate uncertainty, by itself, 
cannot constitute good cause. To hold otherwise would 
have the effect of writing the notice and comment 
requirements out of the statute. The Attorney General 
states in the Interim Rule that waiver is needed in order 
to eliminate “any possible uncertainty” in regard to the 
retroactive application of SORNA’s registration 
requirements. Interim Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 8896 
(emphasis added); see also Dean, 604 F.3d at 1280 
(stating that the Interim Rule’s “guidance rationale is 
particularly important here as the persons who were 
affected by the rule were already convicted of their prior 
crimes and need to know whether to register”). This 
rationale cannot serve as a basis for good cause because 
some uncertainty follows the enactment of any law that 
provides an agency with administrative responsibility. 
Uncertainty exists because the actual substantive rules 
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that will eventually result from the delegation are 
uncertain until the agency invokes its power to 
promulgate a rule or define the scope of its authority. 
Consequently, if elimination of uncertainty were 
sufficient to show good cause, then no rule would require 
notice and comment. Nader v. Sawhill, 514 F.2d 1064, 
1068 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975). An agency’s 
intention to provide clarity, without more, cannot amount 
to good cause.  
Further undermining the uncertainty rationale is 
that the elimination of notice and comment, with the 
simultaneous request for postpromulgation comments, 
does not achieve the stated goal of eliminating “any” 
uncertainty. Requesting comments on the Interim Rule 
implicitly suggests that the rule will be reconsidered and 
possibly changed in light of these comments. But that 
means the level of uncertainty is, at best, unchanged, and 
possibly enhanced because parties do not view the 
Interim Rule as the final version. Johnson, 632 F.3d at 
929 (“[T]he goal of reducing uncertainty is undercut by 
the quest for post-promulgation comments, which could 
have changed the rule.”); Gould, 568 F.3d at 479 
(Michael, J., dissenting) (“[T]he possibility of an 
alteration to the interim rule after its promulgation 
increases rather than eliminates uncertainty.” (emphasis 
in original)). Accordingly, if the Attorney General 
intended to eliminate “any possible uncertainty,” the best 
course to have taken would have been to provide for 
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notice and comment at the start and later issue a final 
rule. His choice not to follow this path undermines his 
stated justification of eliminating uncertainty. 
The Government argues that the limiting principle 
to its uncertainty justification is the unique necessity of 
the Interim Rule. Urgent action was required, according 
to the Attorney General, to ensure that “SORNA would 
be enforceable at all as to sex offenders convicted before 
July 27, 2006 [the Act’s effective date].” Gov’t Suppl. 
Br. at 19 (emphasis in original). This reasoning is 
unpersuasive for several reasons. First, this argument 
assumes that retroactivity was the necessary conclusion 
of the Attorney General’s rulemaking—an assumption 
that is contrary to the very purpose of notice and 
comment for agencies to “maintain[] a flexible and open-
minded attitude towards its own rules.” Prometheus 
Radio Project, 652 F.3d at 449. Second, a need to 
regulate affected parties does not create the urgency 
necessary to establish good cause. Our prior decisions 
have recognized urgency alone as sufficient only when a 
deadline imposed by Congress, the executive, or the 
judiciary requires agency action in a timespan that is too 
short to provide a notice and comment period. See, e.g., 
Schweiker, 669 F.2d at 883 (concluding there was good 
cause when Congress provided only forty-nine days to 
issue comprehensive rules); Am. Iron & Steel, 568 F.2d 
at 292 (concluding there was no good cause when the 
agency had at least three months to promulgate the 
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regulations at issue). Here, there is no deadline imposed 
by SORNA on the Attorney General other than, perhaps, 
its provision that SORNA’s predecessor statute would 
remain in effect for three years. SORNA §§ 124(a), 
129(b); 42 U.S.C. § 16924. Three years is hardly the 
deadline of mere days we found to be adequate for good 
cause in Schweiker. 669 F.2d at 883. The government’s 
urgency rationale cannot be said to follow from our 
previous urgency cases. 
Because no externally-imposed deadline created 
urgency, the Government’s urgency argument must rest 
on the notion that the nature of sex offenses warrants 
good cause. This may be, to some, an appealing intuition 
but it lacks a basis in law. Indeed, if there is any 
presumption when it comes to questions of good cause in 
criminal cases, we agree with the D.C. Circuit that “a 
criminal prosecution founded on an agency rule should 
be held to the strict letter of the APA.” United States v. 
Picciotto, 875 F.2d 345, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1989); accord 
Cain, 583 F.3d at 422; Johnson, 632 F.3d at 930. The 
liberty interest at stake is greater than the ordinary civil 
interests litigated in administrative cases. This forecloses 
our adoption of the Government’s position that notice 
and comment are somehow less important in criminal 
cases, and thus easier to waive for good cause, because 
the procedural delay allows criminal harm to continue 
during the time required to comply with the APA. If 
Congress had decided that the harm from delay was too 
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great to warrant notice and comment, it could have 
statutorily dispensed with the APA requirements or made 
SORNA’s registration requirements retroactive on its 
own. Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. at 981–82. Congress chose not 
to. In light of the subject matter of the Act, Congress’ 
failure to address the effective date cannot serve as a 
basis for finding good cause on the basis of urgency. 
The Government posits that rejecting its 
uncertainty argument “would mean that an agency’s 
perception of urgency never could satisfy 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(b)(B) because every delegation entails some 
delay.” Gov’t Suppl. Br. at 21 (emphasis in original). The 
only rule we establish today is that “an agency’s 
perception of urgency” alone is not sufficient to satisfy 
§ 553(b)(B)’s good cause exception. Section 553(b)(B) 
allows waiver only if notice and comment are 
“impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to public 
interest.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B). Urgency for urgency’s 
sake, or “an agency’s perception of urgency,” without 
any supporting evidence, is not among those situations 
identified by the statute. As with any other administrative 
agency conclusion, we require some statement of facts or 
circumstances that justifies the existence of good cause 
(e.g. an imminent, externally imposed deadline or the 
existence of an emergency). See, e.g., Schweiker, 669 
F.2d at 883; Haw. Helicopter Operators Ass’n v. F.A.A., 
51 F.3d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding the FAA 
had good cause when a series of accidents occurred after 
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Congress passed the relevant legislation showed a need 
for urgent action); DeRieux v. Five Smiths, Inc., 499 F.2d 
1321, 1332 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974) (concluding 
there was good cause where notice of the rule would 
have resulted in market-distorting behavior). The Interim 
Rule lacks such facts or justification and thus cannot 
constitute a reasoned basis for good cause. 
The Attorney General’s second rationale, which 
the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits relied on most heavily, 
is that waiver of the notice and comment requirements 
were necessary in order to “protect the public from sex 
offenders who fail to register” thus creating “practical 
dangers,” including “the commission of additional sexual 
assaults and child sexual abuse or exploitation offenses 
by sex offenders.” Interim Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 8896–
97; Dean, 604 F.3d at 1281–82; Gould, 568 F.3d at 470. 
This rationale relies on the D.C. Circuit’s explanation 
that good cause can be found “where delay [from notice 
and comment] could result in serious harm.” Chambers 
of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 908 (D.C. Cir. 
2006). This public safety rationale cannot constitute a 
reasoned basis for good cause because it is nothing more 
than a rewording of the statutory purpose Congress 
provided in the text of SORNA. 
Mere restatement of the public safety rationale 
offered in the statute cannot constitute good cause 
because it would allow agencies to circumvent the notice 
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and comment requirements. The statutory purpose of 
SORNA is “to protect the public from sex offenders and 
offenders against children.” 42 U.S.C. § 16901. The 
Interim Rule’s public safety rationale for good cause, in 
turn, is to reduce “practical dangers” to the public that 
“include the commission of additional sexual assaults and 
child sexual abuse or exploitation offenses by sex 
offenders.” 72 Fed. Reg. at 8897–98. Yet this rationale 
does no more than iterate the harm that “sex offenders 
and offenders against children” represent. Valverde, 628 
F.3d at 1167 (“[T]he Attorney General did little more 
than restate the general dangers of child sexual assault, 
abuse, and exploitation that Congress sought to prevent 
when it enacted SORNA on July 27, 2006.”). Most, if not 
all, laws passed by Congress requiring agencies to 
promulgate new rules are designed to eliminate some real 
or perceived harm. If the mere assertion that such harm 
will continue while an agency gives notice and receives 
comments were enough to establish good cause, then 
notice and comment would always have to give way. An 
agency will invariably be able to point to some 
continuing harm during the notice and comment period 
antecedent to the promulgation of a rule. Id. at 1167–68. 
Indeed, one should not expect otherwise: if the statute did 
not address a perceived continuing harm, then Congress 
would not have legislated in the first place. The Attorney 
General’s iteration of the very harm Congress legislated 
against cannot be sufficient justification for good cause. 
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In reaching the opposite conclusion, the Eleventh 
Circuit relied heavily on the D.C. Circuit’s formulation 
that good cause may exist when notice and comment 
would result in “serious harm.” Dean, 604 F.3d at 1281 
(quoting Jifry v. F.A.A., 370 F.3d 1174, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 
2004)). We disagree that the public safety rationale 
offered in the record would result in “serious harm.” 
Situations that fit within the serious harm justification for 
good cause require some set of facts and circumstances 
showing why the harm at issue demonstrates a need to 
waive the notice and comment requirements. In Hawaii 
Helicopter Operators Ass’n v. F.A.A., for example, the 
FAA waived notice and comment after seven helicopter 
accidents occurred in the first nine months of 1994. 51 
F.3d at 214. Based on these accidents, the FAA 
determined that there was “an urgent safety problem that 
[could not] be adequately addressed solely by 
enforcement of existing regulations.” Id. The agency 
went on to provide other facts showing that the safety 
problem was ongoing and that accidents had dramatically 
increased in frequency in recent months. Id. (explaining 
that the agency showed there were twenty accidents from 
1991 to 1994, seven of which occurred in the nine 
months before the rule was issued in late 1994). The 
Ninth Circuit held that this was sufficient to show good 
cause under § 553(b)(B). Id. Hawaii Helicopter thus 
shows what the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have alluded to: 
the serious harm justification for waiver requires 
agencies to point to something specific that illustrates a 
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particular harm that will be caused by the delay required 
for notice and comment. Cain, 583 F.3d at 422 (“[T]he 
Attorney General gave no specific evidence of actual 
harm . . .”); Valverde, 628 F.3d at 1167 (listing possible 
situations that might justify the need to waive notice and 
comment). 
The D.C. Circuit’s own application of its serious 
harm rationale confirms this specificity requirement. For 
example, in Jifry v. F.A.A., 370 F.3d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 
2004), the FAA relied on the serious harm justification to 
bypass notice and comment in issuing new regulations 
relating to the automatic suspension or revocation of 
alien pilots’ licenses. Id. at 1179–80. The agency 
explained that waiver was necessary “in order to 
minimize security threats and potential security 
vulnerabilities to the fullest extent possible.” Id. The Jifry 
Court found this rationale compelling because of the 
agency’s “legitimate concern over the threat of further 
terrorist acts involving aircraft in the aftermath of 
September 11, 2001.” Id. That is, the circumstances 
arising from a specific situation—9/11 in this case—
justified the waiver of notice and comment. Jifry and 
Hawaii Helicopter, therefore, show that an agency 
asserting the “serious harm” justification must state with 
specificity some facts and circumstances which 
demonstrate that a new regulation must be swiftly put in 
place. 
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This specificity requirement is little more than a 
demand that an agency comply with § 553(b)(B)’s 
language which requires within the rule “a brief 
statement of reasons” supporting why an agency wishes 
to waive notice and comment. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B). The 
degree of specificity required is not great, as the FAA’s 
reliance on September 11 in Jifry illustrates, but the 
reasons provided must demonstrate the need for a new 
regulation in a shorter-than-usual time span.  
Here, the Interim Rule’s mere restatement of the 
statute’s public safety goal is hardly comparable to the 
specific facts or inferable reasons set forth in Hawaii 
Helicopter or Jifry. The Rule did not point to any event 
that would make a failure to immediately implement the 
rule especially harmful. We lack, for example, any 
factual support for the Rule’s assertion that “additional” 
sex offenses will occur absent immediate rulemaking. 
We do not know whether the Attorney General was 
suggesting that there will be an increase in the frequency 
of these offenses, or simply that the existing harm which 
the underlying legislation sought to address will 
continue. Quite simply, the Interim Rule’s explanations 
rely on nothing more than the nature of the harm being 
regulated to justify waiver. The Government’s “serious 
harm” rationale does not constitute a reasoned basis for 
good cause. 
The Eleventh Circuit’s formulation of the “serious 
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harm” rationale in Dean to permit waiver for good cause 
whenever “delay would do real harm” only reinforces the 
need for a specificity requirement. Dean, 604 F.3d 
at 1281. All, or at least the vast majority of, regulations 
are designed to mitigate or eliminate some harm that is 
presumably real. The delay in promulgating any 
regulation will thus “do real harm” because it will allow 
the currently existing harm addressed by the statute to 
continue unabated during the notice and comment period. 
To avoid the good cause exemption swallowing up notice 
and comment requirements, a limiting principle is 
needed. Hawaii Helicopter and Jifry demonstrate that the 
Government must explain why the harm targeted by the 
regulation will worsen unless notice and comment is 
dispensed with.  
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit’s distinguishing 
of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits’ reasoning on the basis 
that those cases limited good cause to emergency 
situations without recognizing the serious harm or real 
harm rationale does not convince us that the Interim Rule 
adequately set out good cause. Dean, 604 F.3d at 1281. 
Even were we to agree that the emergency rationale for 
good cause is distinct from the serious harm rationale—a 
distinction that is difficult to make in a meaningful 
way—the Attorney General must still explain why the 
harm caused by delay here is unique in a way that 
warrants dispensing with notice and comment. The 
Eleventh Circuit does not point to any such explanation 
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by the Attorney General, relying instead on the 
“practical” benefits obtained from retroactivity, such as 
the reduced risk of sex offenses by sex offenders and the 
increased ability to apprehend sex offenders who fail to 
register. Id. The absence of a citation to the Interim Rule 
in the Eleventh Circuit’s explanation is telling and 
demonstrates the  weakness of the Attorney General’s 
justification. Id. 
We therefore hold that the Interim Rule did not 
provide sufficient justification to constitute good cause 
for the waiver of notice and comment. 
C. Prejudice 
 Our conclusion that the Attorney General lacked 
good cause to waive notice and comment does not end 
our analysis. The APA requires that “due account shall 
be taken of the rule of prejudicial error” when courts 
review agency actions. 5 U.S.C. § 706(F). This means 
that we must determine whether the agency’s error is 
harmless. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 407 (2009). 
The courts of appeals that have concluded that the 
Attorney General lacked good cause to waive notice and 
comment are divided over whether this error was 
harmless.11
                                                 
11 Our prejudice analysis is limited to the Attorney 
General’s lack of good cause to waive the notice and 
comment requirements found in § 553(b)–(c). We agree 
 The Fifth Circuit has concluded that the 
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Attorney General’s error was harmless. Johnson, 632 
F.3d at 930–32; see also Dean, 604 F.3d at 1288–89 
(Wilson, J., concurring) (arguing that the Dean majority 
was incorrect in holding that the Attorney General had 
good cause but concurring on grounds that the error is 
harmless). The Sixth Circuit has concluded that the 
Attorney General’s error was not harmless. United States 
v. Utesch, 596 F.3d 302, 312–13 (6th Cir. 2010). We 
agree with the Sixth Circuit, albeit for difference reasons. 
None of the courts of appeals have addressed how the 
criminal nature of the case before them affects the 
harmless error analysis. We conclude that this 
characteristic has important meaning because it shifts the 
burden of showing harmlessness onto the Government. It 
is a burden that the Government cannot meet here. 
The Government bears the burden of showing that 
the failure to provide notice and comment was harmless 
because of the liberty interest at stake in a criminal 
proceeding. In Sanders, the Supreme Court interpreted a 
similar prejudice provision, 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2), 
which provides that the Veterans Court must “take due 
                                                                                                             
with the Fifth Circuit that Reynolds cannot argue he was 
prejudiced by the Attorney General’s lack of good cause 
to waive the thirty-day notice requirement in § 553(d) 
because the alleged conduct in the indictment took place 
more than thirty days after the Interim Rule was 
promulgated. Johnson, 632 F.3d at 930. 
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account of the rule of prejudicial error.” Sanders, 556 
U.S. at 407. The Court treated § 7261(b)(2) and § 706 of 
the APA as identical in their incorporation of the 
harmless error rule. Id. Specifically, the Court explained 
that the language found in these provisions requires 
courts “to apply the same kind of ‘harmless error’ rule 
that courts ordinarily apply in civil cases” and that “the 
APA’s reference to ‘prejudicial error’ [in § 706] is 
intended to ‘sum up in succinct fashion the harmless 
error rule applied by the courts in review of lower court 
decisions as well as of administrative bodies.’” Id. 
(quoting Dept. of Justice, Attorney’s general Manual on 
the Administrative Procedures Act 110 (1947)) 
(emphasis in original). This could be read to incorporate 
civil harmless-error review only, but the Court concluded 
that its review of the Federal Circuit’s harmless error 
approach for review of the Veterans Court in Sanders 
would be conducted “in light of [the Court’s] general 
case law governing application of the harmless error 
standard.” Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, the 
language in § 706 that incorporates the rule—“due 
account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error,” 5 
U.S.C. § 706—does not make a distinction between civil 
or criminal harmless error review. Instead, as the Sanders 
Court suggests by its review “in light of the general case 
law,” the language of § 706 plainly incorporates the 
entire body of harmless error jurisprudence. 
This incorporation is notable here because 
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harmless error doctrine distinguishes between civil and 
criminal matters in allocating the burden of proof. In civil 
matters, the “party seeking reversal normally must 
explain why the erroneous ruling caused harm.” Sanders, 
556 U.S. at 410. In criminal matters, however, the 
Government has the burden of proving that an error did 
not cause harm. Id. (“But we have placed [the burden to 
show error was harmless] on the appellee only when the 
matter underlying review was criminal.”). The burden 
shifts in criminal matters because “the Government seeks 
to deprive an individual of his liberty, thereby providing 
good reason to require the Government to explain why an 
error should not upset the trial court’s determination.” Id. 
Here, Reynolds’s liberty is at stake. Accordingly, the 
Government must bear the burden of showing that the 
failure to provide notice and comment did not cause 
harm. 
The Government argues that this conclusion is 
erroneous because sex-offender registration-regimes like 
SORNA impose only civil penalties. Smith v. Doe, 538 
U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003) (holding that a sex-offender 
registration-regime did not violate the Ex Post Facto 
Clause because it is a “civil regulatory scheme”); United 
States v. Parks, 698 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2012) (applying 
the Smith rationale to reject an ex post facto argument 
against SORNA). These registration regimes are 
therefore civil ones for which, the Government argues, 
we would apply the harmless-error framework that we 
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apply in any other civil matter. This argument is similar 
to the Government’s argument in O’Neal v. McAninch, 
513 U.S. 432 (1995), that a petitioner requesting relief 
through the writ of habeas corpus must bear the burden 
of showing that errors were prejudicial because habeas 
proceedings are civil proceedings. Id. at 440. The 
Supreme Court rejected that argument on the basis that it 
“fail[ed] to take into account the stakes involved in a 
habeas proceeding.” Id. As the Court explained, 
“although habeas is a civil proceeding, someone’s 
custody, rather than mere civil liability, is at stake.” For 
that reason, the petitioner did not have the burden of 
showing that the error was harmful. Id. O’Neal makes 
clear that the nature of the underlying statutory regime 
does not control our analysis. Instead, as seen in Sanders 
and O’Neal, the nature of the interests at stake in the 
proceeding before the court are determinative. The 
Government’s reliance on the civil nature of SORNA’s 
registration requirements to shift the burden to Reynolds 
is misguided. 
The Government’s task in carrying this burden is 
difficult here. The Attorney General chose to completely 
forego notice and comment; he did not merely commit 
some technical error in providing a notice and comment 
period. In the ordinary civil case, prejudice from the 
failure to comply with the notice and comment regime 
falls into two general categories. In the first category, the 
agency has provided some notification and method for 
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commenting but some technical failure in that process 
violates statutory requirements. City of Waukesha v. 
EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 246 (D.C. Cir. 2003). In these 
“technical failure” cases, the party challenging the 
agency rule “may be required to demonstrate that, had 
proper notice been provided, they would have submitted 
additional, different comments that could have 
invalidated the rationale” of the rule. Id. In the second 
category of cases, “the agency [has] entirely failed to 
comply with notice and comment requirements and the 
agency has offered no persuasive evidence that possible 
objections to its final rules have been given sufficient 
consideration.” Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 752 
(D.C. Cir. 1991). In these “complete failure” situations, 
the petitioner does not need to show that he would have 
offered comments that would have invalidated the 
rationale underlying the promulgated rule. Id.; see also 
McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 
1323–24 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (explaining that the 
“imposition of [ ] a burden [to show specific prejudice] 
on the challenger is normally inappropriate where the 
agency has completely failed to comply with § 553”). 
Instead, the “utter failure to comply with notice and 
comment cannot be considered harmless if there is any 
uncertainty at all as to the effect of that failure.” Sugar 
Cane Growers Co-op of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 
96 (D.C. Cir. 2002). That means that, in civil cases, the 
party challenging the administrative rule has a heavier 
burden when the errors that have occurred in the process 
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are only technical as opposed to when the agency has 
completely failed to provide notice and comment.  
This distinction between technical errors and 
complete procedural failures is a sensible one: it is driven 
by a concern that harmless error analysis could be used to 
eliminate the notice and comment requirements together 
with a recognition that the underlying purposes of 
§ 553’s requirements are often satisfied when the errors 
made are mere technical ones. As the D.C. and Ninth 
Circuits have explained, “if the government could skip 
[§ 553] procedures, engage in informal consultation, and 
then be protected from judicial review unless a petitioner 
could show a new argument—not presented informally—
section 553 obviously would be eviscerated.” Sugar 
Cane Growers, 289 F.3d at 96. This risk is genuine 
because “[a]n agency is not required to adopt a rule that 
conforms in any way to the comments presented to it.” 
Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1487 
(9th Cir. 1992). So “if the harmless error rule were to 
look solely to result, an agency could always claim that it 
would have adopted the same rule even if it had complied 
with the APA procedures.” Id. Accordingly, “[t]o avoid 
gutting the APA’s procedural requirements, harmless 
error analysis in administrative rulemaking must [ ] focus 
on the process as well as the result.” Id.  
Focusing on the process has allowed courts to 
make a meaningful distinction between technical errors 
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and complete failures of notice and comment. Technical 
errors are often harmless absent a demonstration that the 
challenger would have made a comment to the rule not 
considered by the agency because these errors often do 
not prevent the purposes of notice and comment from 
being satisfied. Id. We have previously explained that 
“[a]mong the purposes of the APA’s notice and comment 
requirements are ‘(1) to ensure that agency regulations 
are tested via exposure to diverse public comment, (2) to 
ensure fairness to affected parties, and (3) to give 
affected parties an opportunity to develop evidence in the 
record to support their objections to the rule and thereby 
enhance the quality of judicial review.’” Prometheus 
Radio Project, 652 F.3d at 449 (quoting Int’l Union, 
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health 
Admin., 407 F.3d 1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). “In 
addition, ‘a chance to comment . . . [enables] the agency 
[to] maintain[] a flexible and open-minded attitude 
towards its own rules.’” Id. (quoting McLouth Steel 
Prods., 838 F.2d at 1325). As part of achieving these 
purposes, “there must be an exchange of views, 
information, and criticism between interested persons and 
the agency.” Id. (quoting Home Box Office, Inc. v. 
F.C.C., 567 F.2d 9, 35–36 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).  
These purposes are often fulfilled despite the 
presence of technical errors. In Riverbend Farms, for 
example, the Secretary of Agriculture’s weekly final 
rules that set quantity limitations on navel orange 
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production were challenged on procedural grounds. 958 
F.2d at 1482–84. These final rules were reached in a two 
step process. First, there was an annual marketing policy 
that interested parties were notified about and given a 
chance to discuss at a public hearing that predicted the 
weekly restrictions. Second, there were weekly meetings 
during the growing season that growers were notified of 
and could comment on at a public meeting. The final 
recommendation for the appropriate restriction for the 
week was made after the meeting and became the 
Secretary’s final rule. Id. at 1483. Although this process 
did not conform with § 553’s requirements because the 
meetings were not publicized in the Federal Register and 
there was no opportunity for written comments, id. 
at 1485–87, the error was deemed harmless, id. at 1487. 
The parties had participated for decades in the 
rulemaking process used by the Secretary, and that 
process included notification to interested parties as well 
as consideration of comments received. Id. This, the 
court held, was determinative because it showed that the 
“purposes” of the notice requirement were fulfilled and 
that the process “afforded the public a full and fair 
opportunity to be heard.” Id. (quoting Sagebrush 
Rebellion, Inc. v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760, 769 (9th Cir. 
1986)). In short, the technical errors in the process used 
did not prevent the “exchange of views, information, and 
criticism between interested persons and the agency” 
which is the very essence of notice and comment 
requirements. This allowed the Riverbend Farms Court 
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to conclude that the errors were harmless. 
  These harmless technical errors stand in contrast 
to an agency’s complete failure to comply with § 553’s 
requirements. In those situations, the purposes of notice 
and comment often cannot be fulfilled because there has 
been no effort to have the kind of exchange of views and 
information the requirements are intended to generate. 
Without notice and comment, the regulations are not 
tested by public input nor do and interested parties have 
an opportunity to develop a record for judicial review. 
The lack of a record makes it very difficult for a 
reviewing court to “say with certainty whether 
petitioner’s comments would have had some effect if 
they had been considered when the issue was open,” even 
if we are not sure what those comments would have been. 
McLouth Steel Prods., 838 F.2d at 1324. This doubt 
provides uncertainty “as to the effect of [the] failure,” 
which means that courts are often hard-pressed to 
conclude that the failure has actually resulted in 
prejudice. Sugar Cane Growers, 289 F.3d at 96 (“[U]tter 
failure to comply with notice and comment cannot be 
considered harmless if there is any uncertainty at all as to 
the effect of that failure.”). Courts, then, should be 
hesitant to conclude that complete failure to comply with 
§ 553’s requirements is harmless. 
This is not to say that there is a presumption of 
harm when an agency does not provide notice and 
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comment—only that the nature of complete failure often 
results in courts’ finding prejudice. Courts do find that 
the complete failure to provide for notice and comment is 
harmless, for instance, when an agency’s substantive rule 
is “the only reasonable one” that the court “would reverse 
. . . if [the agency] came out the other way.” Sheppard v. 
Sullivan, 906 F.2d 756, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In other 
words, there is no harm from a complete failure when the 
administrative record demonstrates that the conclusion 
reached in the administrative rule was the only possible 
conclusion. In these instances, the lack of notice and 
comment could not have caused harm because the facts 
and circumstances reveal that the substantive conclusion 
reached was the only one possible. That makes testing 
the rule through public comment and the development of 
an administrative record unnecessary. See id. at 761 
(explaining that the language of the statute at issue and 
the statute’s legislative history foreclosed any reading of 
the provision different from the agency’s).  
In the cases discussed above, courts have discussed 
possible prejudice in the civil context. Here, we must 
determine how shifting the burden from the complaining 
party to the Government affects the analysis. In civil 
cases, the burden on a party challenging a rule is more 
difficult to satisfy when the errors are technical than 
when an agency has failed completely to provide notice 
and comment. In the criminal context, the Government 
will have a heavier burden to show that its complete 
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failure to comply with § 553’s requirements did not cause 
prejudice than if it had made only technical errors in the 
promulgation of the relevant rule. The reasons are 
obvious. In technical-error cases, the Government will 
more likely have undergone a process that provided 
notice and permitted some exchange of ideas. That 
process makes the fulfillment of § 553’s purposes more 
probable and the risk of circumvention less so. On the 
other hand, in complete-failure cases, the government 
will not be able to rely on a process that independently 
satisfies the purpose of requiring notice and comment. It 
will only be able to assert that the decision it made was 
inescapable regardless of what comments could have 
been made. 
Here, the Government’s burden is heavy because 
the Attorney General completely failed to provide notice 
and comment. We conclude that the Government cannot 
carry that burden. First, as with most “complete failure” 
situations, the Government has not shown that the 
purposes of notice and comment have been satisfied. The 
Interim Rule was never “tested via exposure to diverse 
public comment,” Prometheus Radio Project, 652 F.3d 
at 449. There was never an opportunity for Reynolds—or 
any other interested party—to provide meaningful 
comments relating to the substance of the rule. This also 
means that interested parties never had the “opportunity 
to develop evidence in the record” to enable more 
effective review. Id. Any suggestion that the 
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postpromulgation comments to the Interim Rule can 
satisfy these purposes misses the point. See Sharon Steel 
Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 1979) (“We 
hold that the period for comments after promulgation 
cannot substitute for the prior notice and comment 
required by the APA.”).  
The Government also has not shown that the 
Attorney General “maintain[ed] a flexible and open-
minded attitude towards” the Interim Rule. Prometheus 
Radio Project, 652 F.3d at 449. The Interim Rule 
demonstrates a single-minded commitment to the 
substantive result reached: the complete retroactive 
application of SORNA’s registration requirements to sex 
offenders who were convicted before SORNA’s 
enactment. The Attorney General states that the Interim 
Rule “serves the narrower, immediately necessary 
purpose of foreclosing any dispute as to whether SORNA 
is applicable” to pre-SORNA offenders. Interim Rule, 72 
Fed. Reg. at 8896 (emphasis added). He sought to 
eliminate “any dispute” because “sex offenders with 
predicate convictions predating SORNA who [did] not 
want to be subject to the SORNA registration 
requirements, or who wish[ed] to avoid being held to 
account for having violated those requirements, [had] not 
been barred from attempting to devise arguments that 
SORNA is inapplicable to them.” Id. (emphasis added). 
The Attorney General thus states that the purpose of the 
Interim Rule is to eliminate any dissenting points of view 
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about whether SORNA’s registration requirements were 
to be applied retroactively—the very subject matter about 
which he was to keep an “open mind.” Under those 
circumstances, the Interim Rule can hardly be seen as 
fulfilling the purposes of notice and comment. 
The failure to satisfy these purposes is especially 
troubling because the Attorney General’s decision to 
issue the Interim Rule undermines the very essence of 
why notice and comment is required. “[T]he essential 
purpose of according § 553 notice and comment 
opportunities is to reintroduce public participation and 
fairness to affected parties after governmental authority 
has been delegated to unrepresentative agencies.” Dia 
Nav. Co., Ltd. v. Pomeroy, 34 F.3d 1255, 1265 (3d Cir. 
1994). Notice and comment “avoid[s] the inherently 
arbitrary nature of unpublished ad hoc determinations.” 
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974). Here, the lack 
of an opportunity for anyone to comment on the Interim 
Rule means that there was never a reintroduction of 
public participation “after governmental authority [had] 
been delegated to [an] unrepresentative agenc[y].” Dia 
Nav., 34 F.3d at 1262. And without public participation, 
all that is left before an agency promulgates a rule is the 
agency’s ipse dixit that its determination will not be 
arbitrary and that it is fair to affected parties.  
Even the timing of the Interim Rule undermines 
the reliability of the agency’s justification. The rule was 
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promulgated only after the Attorney General realized that 
his interpretation that SORNA’s registration 
requirements were automatically retroactive was 
incorrect. Reynolds’s conviction thus appears to rest not 
on carefully considered facts and reason but on a hasty 
reaction from an Attorney General caught by surprise 
when courts, including the Supreme Court, disagreed 
with his interpretation of SORNA. More troubling is that 
this hasty reaction resulted in an interim rule that 
reiterated the substantive, unpublished judgment 
expressed in litigation (that SORNA was retroactive for 
all pre-SORNA offenders) before the Interim Rule was 
issued—exactly the type of “unpublished ad hoc 
determination[]” that is “inherently arbitrary [in] nature” 
and that notice and comment are intended to avoid, 
Morton, 415 U.S. at 232.  
The Government cannot show therefore that the 
promulgation of the Interim Rule has satisfied the 
purposes of notice and comment. Like other “complete 
failure” situations, the process used to promulgate the 
rule was completely devoid of the “exchange of views, 
information, and criticism between interested persons and 
the agency” that ensures well-reasoned and fair rules. 
Prometheus Radio Project, 652 F.3d at 449. The 
Government has not provided any reason to believe that 
the purposes of notice and comment are satisfied through 
other means. Accordingly, it has not met its burden of 
showing that the failure to comply with notice and 
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comment did not harm Reynolds. 
Furthermore, the Government cannot show that the 
Attorney General’s conclusion was inescapably correct. 
The strongest argument the Government can muster that 
full retroactivity was the only possible conclusion is the 
Fifth Circuit’s rationale that “the Attorney General’s 
interim rulemaking [ ] involved a yes or no decision,” 
rather than a “complex regulatory decision” that involved 
“nuanced and detailed regulations that greatly benefit 
from expert regulated entity participation.” Johnson, 632 
F.3d at 932. But the Supreme Court, in this very case, 
recognized that whether to make SORNA’s registration 
requirements retroactive and the scope of any retroactive 
application did not resemble an on–off switch. Before 
remanding this case, the Supreme Court recognized the 
“practical problems arising when the Act sought to apply 
[ ] new registration requirements to pre-Act offenders.” 
Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. at 981–82. And the Court noted that 
Congress knew that SORNA “could require newly 
registering or re-registering ‘a large number’ of pre-Act 
offenders,” which “could prove expensive” and “might 
not prove feasible to do [ ] immediately.” Id. at 981 
(citing Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 38063). These 
considerations, the Court observed, “might have 
warranted different federal registration treatment of 
different categories of pre-Act offenders.” Id. Congress’ 
delegation to the Attorney General was thus a delegation 
“to examine these pre-Act offender problems” and 
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develop “one efficient and desirable solution.” Id. 
Accordingly, the Attorney General’s decision regarding 
the retroactivity of SORNA’s registration requirements 
cannot be considered a foregone conclusion.  
As the Supreme Court points out, the Attorney 
General recognized that his retroactivity decision was not 
a yes-or-no decision. In the Final Rule, the Attorney 
General distinguishes between categories of pre-SORNA 
offenders. See id. (citing the Final Rule and a later 
SORNA regulatory decision to support its conclusion that 
“different categories of pre-Act offenders” might warrant 
“different federal registration treatment”). The Final Rule 
thus requires jurisdictions to register offenders “who 
remain in the system as prisoners, supervisees, or 
registrants, or reenter the system through subsequent 
convictions.” It does not require the registration of 
“offenders who have fully left the system and merged 
into the general population.” Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 
at 38035. Although this distinction is made only for 
determining if a state is complying with SORNA—rather 
than what obligations are imposed on the sex offenders 
themselves, Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 38035—the 
distinction shows that the Attorney General’s decision to 
make the registration requirements uniformly retroactive 
was not necessarily an across the board yes or no. 
 The Fifth Circuit’s Johnson decision offered 
several other justifications in an effort to show that the 
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complete failure of notice and comment here was 
harmless.12
                                                 
12 The reasoning found in Johnson largely tracks Judge 
Wilson’s arguments in his Dean concurrence, 604 F.3d at 
1288–89 (Wilson, J. concurring). Our analysis is 
intended to address both. 
 Central to its conclusion that the results 
Judge Wilson includes an additional argument based on 
the 1995 Administrative Conference of the United States 
recommendation regarding good cause exceptions: 
Where an agency has used post-
promulgation comment procedures, 
responded to significant adverse comments 
and ratifies or modified the rule as 
appropriate, the Conference suggests that a 
reviewing court generally should not set 
aside that ratified or modified rule solely on 
the basis that adequate good cause did not 
exist to support invoking the exemption 
initially. At this stage, the agency’s initial 
flawed finding of good cause should 
normally be treated as harmless error with 
respect to the validity of the ratified or 
modified rule. 
Adoption of Recommendations, Recommendation 8-32, 
“The ‘Good Cause’ Exemption from APA Rulemaking 
Requirements,” 60 Fed. Reg. 43108, 43112 (Aug. 18, 
1995) (emphasis added). The emphasized text shows why 
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would not have differed if notice and comment had been 
conducted, 632 F.3d at 933, was its determination that 
“the interim rule publication addressed counter-
arguments and set forth the basis and purpose of the 
rule,” id. at 931. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit pointed to 
the Attorney General’s discussion of his “authority to 
prosecute pre-enactment offenders for failing to register,” 
rejection of arguments made by the defendants in 
litigation that SORNA should not apply to them (such as 
ex post facto arguments), and explanation that 
retroactivity furthered the purpose of SORNA. Id. 
at 931–32. Finally, the Court relied on the fact that 
“[t]here is no suggestion that, if given the opportunity to 
comment, [the defendant] would have presented an 
argument the Attorney General did not consider in 
issuing the interim rule.” Id. at 932. In essence, the Fifth 
Circuit determined that the Attorney General addressed 
all possible arguments that could have been suggested 
through notice and comment. 
 We find this reasoning unpersuasive. First, the 
Fifth Circuit’s reasoning misplaces the burden of 
harmless-error analysis on the defendant. Second, the 
                                                                                                             
Judge Wilson’s reliance on the recommendation is 
unpersuasive. The conference’s focus is on the final rule, 
not the initial rule. Reynolds does not challenge the 
validity of the Final Rule, thereby rendering the 
conference’s statement inapposite. 
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Fifth Circuit relied on arguments presented in litigation 
(but not in the Interim Rule) to satisfy the APA’s notice 
and comment requirements—an approach wholly 
unsupported by law. See id. at 932. Furthermore, this 
approach contradicts the longstanding requirement that 
we restrict our review to the administrative record. Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 50; Dougherty v. U.S. 
Board for Correction of Naval Records, 784 F.2d 499, 
501 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Florida Power & Light Co. v. 
Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743–44 (1985)). 
 The final reason we cannot agree with the Johnson 
Court’s evaluation of the administrative record is that the 
record does not support a conclusion that the Attorney 
General’s evaluation was truly comprehensive. It is true 
that the Attorney General discussed the potential ex post 
facto argument against SORNA and sought to justify his 
rule by linking it to the law’s purpose. Interim Rule, 
72 Fed. Reg. at 8896. But the Interim Rule is not all 
inclusive. It does not respond to several arguments 
addressed in the Final Rule that were “concerns of a 
more practical nature.” These included “difficulties in 
finding older convictions and determining whether 
registration is required for them under SORNA’s 
standards” and concerns about whether Congress’ 
delegation of the retroactivity question should be 
construed narrowly out of concerns for fairness. Final 
Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 38031. Furthermore, there is no 
evidence that the Attorney General considered an 
 56 
 
alternative to across-the-board retroactivity for all sex 
offenders in the Interim Rule. These gaps in the Interim 
Rule’s justification—along with the more natural reading 
of the rule as a reassertion of the Attorney General’s 
interpretation of SORNA in an effort to silence 
dissenters—all suggest that the Government has failed to 
demonstrate that the conclusion it reached was truly the 
only one available. 
 The Fifth Circuit also declared that “Johnson 
neither proposes comments he would have made during a 
comment period nor did he choose to involve himself in 
the post-promulgation comment period.” Johnson, 632 
F.3d at 933. Reynolds likewise has not proposed any 
comments he would have submitted nor has he suggested 
how he would have involved himself in the process itself. 
Government Supplemental Br. at 35. The Fifth Circuit 
recognized that the defendant’s “participation in these 
alternative comment forums is not required to find 
prejudice,” but further supported its reliance on this 
reasoning that “Johnson had constructive notice that the 
Attorney General would apply SORNA to pre-enactment 
offenders’ when the Attorney General issued the 
[Proposed Guidelines] on May 30, 2007.” Johnson, 632 
F.3d at 933.  
 This argument fails because it does not recognize 
that the prejudice-causing event is the complete absence 
of notice and comment on the Interim Rule—rather than 
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the Final Rule—from anyone. Fundamentally, the 
Johnson Court’s argument is that defendants like 
Reynolds are not prejudiced when they have shown no 
interest in participating in the notice and comment 
period. But, as the Fifth Circuit notes, there is nothing 
that requires a defendant to do so before a court may find 
prejudice. Id. If a comment period had been provided, 
others who could have asserted his interest—such as 
public defenders and public-interest groups—would 
almost certainly have weighed in. See, e.g., 3d Supp. 
App’x at 102–07 (post-promulgation comments to the 
Interim Rule by juvenile justice organizations arguing for 
withdrawal of the Interim Rule), 142–48 (post-
promulgation comments by New Jersey Public 
Defender’s Office arguing that SORNA should not be 
made retroactive), 155–56 (post-promulgation comments 
by Virginia Attorney General Robert McDonnell 
expressing concern about the cost of making SORNA 
uniformly retroactive). The argument that Reynolds was 
on constructive notice by virtue of the notice of 
rulemaking is beside the point. To the extent this 
argument is intended to support the notion that Reynolds 
would have known that SORNA applied to him, the 
argument is incorrect. The very nature of the publication 
of the Proposed Guidelines was to state that the rules 
included in the Guidelines might come into effect—not 
that the rules were already in effect. These justifications 
simply cannot carry the Government’s burden. 
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 The remaining justification offered by the Fifth 
Circuit is that “the final rulemaking process with full 
APA comment did not change the Attorney General’s 
decision.” Id. at 932–33. This also cannot support a 
finding of no prejudice, for it would allow agencies to 
avoid notice and comment by simply issuing an interim 
rule and subsequently adopting it as the final rule. See 
Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 123, 
129–30 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting a no-prejudice argument 
asserting that the procedural error was harmless because 
it did not change the result after reconsideration since 
having to file a suit to force reconsideration was enough 
to find prejudice); accord Utesch, 569 F.3d at 312 (“[A] 
reviewing court must focus not merely on the ultimate 
rule but on the process of an administrative rulemaking; 
otherwise, an agency could always violate the APA’s 
procedural requirements . . .”). We cannot countenance a 
justification which has the potential for such mischief. 
 Our rejection of each of the reasons offered by the 
Fifth Circuit, upon which the Government relies here, 
leaves the Government empty-handed. The Government 
cannot show that the process used to promulgate the 
Interim Rule satisfies the purposes of § 553 or that the 
substantive rule was so inescapable that we would have 
reversed the Attorney General if he had taken an 
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alternative approach.13 The Johnson Court’s arguments 
are either foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Reynolds, unsupported by the administrative record, or 
unpersuasive in light of our placing of the burden on the 
Government. Accordingly, the Government has failed to 
show that lack of notice and comment did not prejudice 
Reynolds.14
                                                 
13 The failure of the proffered justifications also shows 
that Reynolds can demonstrate prejudice even if he had 
the burden of showing prejudice. In this situation, 
Reynolds could carry his burden by showing that the 
agency completely failed to provide notice and comment 
and that the result was not inescapable. See City of 
Waukesha, 320 F.3d at 246. As seen, both of these 
conditions have been satisfied. We cannot say, therefore, 
that there is no “uncertainty at all” that the effect of the 
Attorney General’s failure was harmless. Sugar Cane 
Growers, 289 F.3d at 96. Accordingly, we would 
conclude that Reynolds was prejudiced even if he was 
required to carry the burden. 
 
14 In addition to the reasons offered, we note that 
prejudice might be found here because our holding that 
the Interim Rule is invalid could necessarily mean that 
there is no legal basis for Reynolds’s conviction. At oral 
argument, the Government contended that the Interim 
Rule could still serve as the basis for his conviction even 
if we were to hold that it was illegally promulgated. Oral 
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Arg. Tr. at 34: 23–24 to 35:1–9.  How this can be is 
unclear. Section 706 requires courts to “hold unlawful 
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” 
that cannot withstand review under the standards 
provided in the section. Our ruling that the Interim Rule 
cannot survive review under any standard in § 706 would 
thus seem to require that we “hold unlawful” and “set 
aside” the Interim Rule such that it cannot be the basis 
for Reynolds’s conviction. 
Prejudice follows because prejudice appears to be 
presumed when courts conclude that the law underlying 
the defendant’s conviction is invalid. See United States v. 
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1583, 1592 (2010) (affirming 
the vacation of a conviction because the underlying 
statute violated the First Amendment without undergoing 
a prejudice analysis); United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 
2537, 2542, 2551 (2012) (same). Such a presumption 
would only be possible if the absence of a legal basis is 
structural error. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 
(1999). Whether structural error is present when the 
conduct underlying an indictment is not actually 
unlawful, because the law making the conduct unlawful 
is invalid, is one aspect of a question the Supreme Court 
has thus far avoided. United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 
549 U.S. 102, 116–17 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that the majority avoided the question of 
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* * * 
 For all of these reasons, we decline to decide the 
appropriate standard of review for agency assertions of 
good cause; we join the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits 
in holding that the Attorney General did not have good 
cause to waive notice and comment in promulgating the 
Interim Rule to make SORNA’s registration requirement 
retroactive; and we join the Sixth Circuit in holding that 
the lack of good cause was prejudicial. We will, 
therefore, vacate Reynolds’s conviction. 
 
                                                                                                             
“whether a constitutionally deficient indictment is 
structural error”). 
These issues have not been fully briefed and there is an 
adequate alternative basis for finding prejudice. 
Accordingly, we decline to resolve both whether 
determining that an administrative rule is invalid under 
§ 706 is comparable to concluding that a statute is invalid 
under the constitution and whether  the lack of legal basis 
for an indictment constitutes structural error. 
FISHER, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 I join the judgment vacating Reynolds’ conviction.  
I concur with the majority in regard to the applicable 
standard of review and the Attorney General’s lack of 
good cause to forego the APA’s notice and comment 
procedures.  However, I take a different approach to the 
prejudice analysis under 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 Because the interests at stake in this matter are 
criminal in nature, the government bears the burden of 
showing that the failure to provide notice and comment 
was harmless.  Maj. Op. Part II.C (citing Shinseki v. 
Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 407 (2009) and O’Neal v. 
McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 440 (1995)).  An utter failure, 
as opposed to a mere technical failure, to provide notice 
and comment cannot be considered harmless if there is 
any uncertainty as to the effect of the failure.  Id. (citing 
Sugar Cane Growers Co-op of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 
89, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, the failure to provide 
notice and comment will be considered harmless only if 
the substantive conclusion reached in the absence of 
notice and comment was the only reasonable one (i.e., we 
would have reversed if the agency had arrived at a 
different conclusion).  Id. (citing Sheppard v. Sullivan, 
906 F.2d 756, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 
 The substantive conclusion of the Interim Rule 
concerned one specific aspect of SORNA – pre-Act 
offenders’ obligations under the statute.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 16913; 72 Fed. Reg. 8894 (“The Department of Justice 
is publishing this interim rule to specify that the 
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requirements of [SORNA] apply to sex offenders 
convicted . . . before the enactment of that Act.”); see 
also 28 C.F.R. § 72.1.  The substantive conclusion of the 
Interim Rule did not concern the other prominent aspect 
of SORNA – incorporation of standards by non-federal 
jurisdictions.  See 42 U.S.C. § 16912; 72 Fed. Reg. 8895 
(describing the two main aspects of SORNA). 
 Based on the Supreme Court’s recognition of the 
“practical problems” that arose “when the Act sought to 
apply the new registration requirements to pre-Act 
offenders,” the majority reasons that the Interim Rule’s 
conclusion was not the result of a simple “yes-or-no 
decision.”  Maj. Op. Part II.C (quoting Reynolds v. 
United States, 132 S. Ct. 975, 981 (2012)).  These 
“practical problems,” however, were not relevant to the 
Interim Rule’s conclusion; rather, these were problems 
associated with incorporation of SORNA’s standards by 
non-federal jurisdictions.  The Supreme Court 
specifically stated that the “problems arise out of the fact 
that the Act seeks to make more uniform a patchwork of 
pre-existing state systems,” and that “[d]oing so could 
require newly registering or re-registering a large number 
of pre-Act offenders.”  Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. at 981 (citing 
73 Fed. Reg. 38063) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Notably, the Supreme Court also stated that 
“[t]hese same considerations might have warranted 
different federal registration treatment of different 
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categories of pre-Act offenders.”  Id.  However, this 
observation was based on a provision of the final 
guidelines that also pertained to incorporation of 
SORNA’s standards by non-federal jurisdictions.  Id. 
(citing 73 Fed. Reg. 38035-36 and 38046-47).  The 
provision allows non-federal jurisdictions to meet 
SORNA’s incorporation requirements without registering 
pre-Act offenders who left the system after they were no 
longer required to register.  73 Fed. Reg. 38035-36 and 
38046-47. 
Because the Attorney General eventually 
distinguished between pre-Act offenders still in the 
system and pre-Act offenders who left the system with 
regard to the obligations of non-federal jurisdictions, the 
majority reasons that the same distinction could have 
been made with regard to the obligations of sex offenders 
themselves, if the Attorney General had properly 
observed the thirty-day notice and comment period when 
promulgating the Interim Rule.  Maj. Op. Part II.C. 
However, even if a thirty-day notice and comment 
period could have resulted in SORNA’s requirements not 
applying to pre-Act offenders who had already left the 
system, this hypothetical change would not have affected 
a pre-Act offender such as Reynolds, who was still in the 
system (and was required to register as a sex offender) at 
the time that he was convicted.  The prejudice analysis 
should focus specifically on Reynolds, rather than on a 
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hypothetical defendant who is not before the Court.  See 
United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 931 (5th Cir. 
2011) (“[A] court must determine whether it is clear that 
the lack of notice and comment did not prejudice the 
petitioner.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Dean, 
604 F.3d 1275, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (Wilson, J., 
concurring) (“Here, though, the decision of the Attorney 
General, as far as Dean cared, was binary – either 
someone with a pre-enactment offense could be charged, 
or he couldn’t be.”) (emphasis added). 
 The question for this Court is whether the Attorney 
General, in accordance with the language of the statute, 
could have declined to apply SORNA’s requirements to 
pre-Act offenders who were still in the system.  The 
answer appears to be yes.  There is nothing in the 
statutory language that would have prevented the 
Attorney General from declining to apply SORNA’s 
requirements to pre-Act offenders still in the system.  
The retroactivity decision was not a forgone conclusion, 
even for pre-Act offenders such as Reynolds.  Thus, the 
substantive conclusion reached in the absence of notice 
and comment was not the only reasonable one, and the 
government has not overcome its burden of proving 
otherwise. 
In sum, Reynolds was prejudiced by the Attorney 
General’s failure to abide by the APA’s notice and 
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comment procedures.  For this reason, I concur in the 
judgment vacating Reynolds’ conviction. 
STAPLETON, J.  concurring: 
 I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.  I write 
only to note additional facts that, for me, provide additional 
support for the conclusion we reach. 
 Quoting from the Act’s statement of its purpose, the 
AG summarized his position regarding the good cause issue 
as follows: 
[Notice and comment] would thwart the 
legislative objective of “protect[ing] the public 
from sex offenders and offenders against 
children” by establishing “a comprehensive 
national system for the registration of those 
offenders,” SORNA § 102, because a 
substantial class of sex offenders could evade 
the Act’s registration requirements and 
enforcement mechanisms during the pendency 
of a proposed rule and delay in the effectiveness 
of a final rule. 
Interim Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 8896-97 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 
553(b)(B)). 
 When SORNA was adopted, all 50 states had 
registration requirements for sex offenders with criminal 
penalties for non-compliance, and Congress had made the 
failure of sex offenders to register in accordance with state 
law a federal offense, albeit one with lesser penalties than 
SORNA.  42 U.S.C. § 14071.  The purpose of SORNA was to 
make existing law more efficient by creating “a 
comprehensive national system” of registration.  Both 
Congress and the AG realized that the creation of such a 
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system would take a substantial period of time.   As of the 
date the Interim Rule was adopted, no state had implemented 
SORNA, and the Act gave states up to three years to do so.  
42 U.S.C. § 16924.The AG provides no explanation for how 
on February 28, 2007, a thirty day period for comment would 
have posed the kind of imminent and serious harm that would 
support a finding of good cause. 
 In short, I agree with the Ninth Circuit in United States 
v. Valverde, 628 F.3d 1159, 1168 (9th Cir. 2011) (footnote 
omitted): 
The issue is not whether sex offenders should 
register, but rather whether the addition of one 
more layer of federal protection atop a 
substantial quilt of existing state and federal 
laws merited  emergency treatment.”  See Dean, 
604 F.3d at 1283 (Wilson, J. concurring).  
Judge Wilson convincingly reasoned that “the 
existence of stringent state and federal criminal 
sanctions on the books at the time the [interim] 
regulation was promulgated obviated the case 
for an emergency.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  The 
Attorney General provided no reason why, in 
view of the existing statutory regime that 
already imposed registration requirements on 
pre-SORNA sex offenders, it was necessary for 
the interim rule to be made effective 
immediately, without providing any opportunity 
for notice and comment.  
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As a result, the AG has failed to carry his burden of proving 
good cause. 
